With signs of fewer Iraqis prioritizing their national identity, Iraqis are likely to see another elections cycle shaped by subnational identities in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the Iraqi government has had a fraught relationship with many of its citizens, with distrust in governmental performance or the institution itself spilling over into both protest and violence. As Iraq heads into its next elections cycle, conflicting attitudes are emerging in Iraqi public opinion—overall, Iraqis are increasingly positive about the national government and satisfied with its performance. Yet these same opinion polls show a potentially worrying trend: approximately half of Iraqis identify with their subnational identities, particularly their ethnicity or sect of Islam, over their identity as an Iraqi national. In past iterations of this trend question, a shift towards identification with sectarian identities has correlated with unrest or conflict, and so any signs of discontent should be closely monitored in the lead-up to elections. 

The Iraq Opinion Thermometer 

The Iraqi Opinion Thermometer (IOT) polling effort has tracked public attitudes that are fundamental to the stability of democracy in Iraq. IOT was developed by the authors in early 2021 to systematically track the social foundations necessary for Iraq to function as a liberal democracy. Every six months, the questionnaire measures Iraqis’ opinions on five main indicators that collectively reflect the state of politics in Iraq via a random probability sample (PPS) survey representing all segments of society. These surveys are conducted using computer-assisted face-to-face interviews (CAPI) by research teams at the Independent Research Group (IIACSS) in the homes of respondents in all Iraqi governorates, and include both rural and urban demographics.

The IOT measures the attitudes held by Iraqis that we judge foundational to maintaining democratic stability in Iraq. One important measure is life satisfaction—the more a citizen is satisfied with her or his life, the more likely they are to support the prevailing political status quo. Other important measures include citizens’ assessments of democratic performance as well as the efficacy of ruling elite governance in the country. The final two measures that are included in the IOT data collection effort are the level of sectarian thinking in the population and how much Iraqis identify as Iraqis above all relative to subnational and transnational identities. 

The IOT uses a series of survey questions to create an index average across the five sub-metrics identified as correlated with attitudes towards the stability of democracy in Iraq.  The closer the overall IOT score is to 4, the more likely Iraq’s democracy is supported by its citizens. If we compare the IOT results from the first wave in March 2021 to the latest wave in January of 2025, the overall attitudinal foundation for Iraqi democratic stability has improved slightly, with the overall IOT score in 2021 averaging 2.3 out of 4 compared to 2.5 out of 4 in 2025. 

This increase is driven by growing positivity towards “governance” indicators beginning in mid-2023, during Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani’s current term. Whether in terms of trust in the government, evaluation of the prime minister’s performance, or the way he operates, there have been clear positive trends expressed by Iraqis during this period. For example, the percentage of those who express confidence in the central government rose from 26% at the beginning of 2022 (prior to Sudani’s election) to 54% now. The percentage of those who say the security situation is somewhat or very good also rose significantly—from 22% to 70%, and the percentage of those who say Iraq is heading in the right direction jumped from 18% to 53% over the same period. However, one caveat and potential warning sign comes from shifting attitudes towards national identity. 53% of Iraqis now prioritize their sub-identities (religious, ethnic, sectarian, etc.) over their broader Iraqi identity. 

The question of “how do you prefer to identify yourself” has been closely linked to the health of the political and social situation in Iraq since it was first asked in IIACSS’s national polling. At the beginning of 2004, when sectarian war first loomed, less than a quarter of Iraqis described themselves as “Iraqis first and foremost.” And while this percentage rose to two-thirds after the defeat of al-Qaeda, it again dipped into the minority during 2012 as ISIS began to occupy large areas of Iraq. After Iraq was liberated from ISIS, the sense of national identity rose again, reaching 58% of Iraqis saying in mid-2022 that they felt Iraqi above all. However, the national identity index fell again at the beginning of this year. The main factor driving this decline in a sense of national identity is that Iraqi media, which is largely organized along sectarian and ethnic lines, has been speaking in increasingly sectarian language in the last year.  Competition for viewers incentivizes Iraqi media companies to try to draw in viewers with issues that they know will play on their emotions. Sectarian competition in Iraq has traditionally been an issue to mobilize the countries different communities. 

These attitudes also differ by group; 60% of Sunni Arabs say their Iraqi identity is first and foremost versus 52% of Shia Arabs. It should be noted here that the percentage of Sunni Arabs who chose a unified national identity was only 40% in 2007, compared to more than 60% for Shia Arabs—while the large majority of Kurds continue to emphasize Kurdish identity overall. The lack of an Iraqi identity among most Kurds has led to calls for independence or greater autonomy among many Iraqi Kurds, but also a corresponding frustration with what the KRG has been able to deliver on a regional level—as evidenced by the most recent Kurdish elections. 

The phenomenon of divergent opinions on various issues—both governmental and otherwise—can also be traced to Iraqis’ ethnic and sectarian affiliations. This is characterized by a major shift in the opinion of Iraqi communities that began in 2017, where the once pessimistic Sunni Arab community has become increasingly accepting of the political status quo in Iraq, while Shia Arabs—theoretically the political as well as demographic majority in the country—have become increasingly disillusioned with their political position alongside Kurds. Previously, during the immediate post-Saddam period of 2003-2017, Sunni Arabs stood in contrast to the general trend of positivity, optimism, and satisfaction with the way the country is governed expressed by the majority of Kurds and Shia Arabs.   

The period following the liberation of Mosul from ISIS has witnessed a complete reversal, with Sunnis becoming more optimistic and positive in their opinions compared to Shia Arabs and Kurds, who have shown a clear decline in satisfaction with politics in Iraq. The clash between the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi government in September 2017 following the independence referendum, followed by the October 2019 uprising in Baghdad and southern Iraq, have both highlighted the impacts that such shifts in public opinion can have on the political system in Iraq. 

One interpretation is that Sunni Arabs have accepted their new position in post-Saddam Iraq after the horrors of ISIS and as the Iraqi political system has calibrated into a government that accommodates the Sunni Arab community. By contrast, Shia Arabs and Kurds have not seen their high expectations for a new political system met in Iraq’s ongoing political and economic developments. Concerns about the future of the country are most acute among Kurds; whereas 62% of Sunni and 56% of Shia Arabs believe that Iraq is heading in the right direction, this number drops sharply to just 11% among Kurds. And when Iraqis were asked about their level of trust in the central government, 62% of Sunni Arabs trusted it, compared to 57% of Shia Arabs and only 33% of Kurds. 

The Significance of National Identity in Iraq

As noted above, sectarianism has been a scourge in Iraq.  While the rise of ISIS was the most extreme example of the consequences of sectarianism, there are other negative consequences that come from Iraqis not sharing a common national identity.  The prioritization of subnational identities over the Iraqi national identity has fractured Iraqi politics, and Iraqi political parties are highly fragmented along largely sectarian and ethnic identities rather than political platforms based on their competing visions for the country. 

This has made coalition building very difficult after elections, an issue that will likely repeat itself in Iraq’s next elections round scheduled for November 2025. The lack of a common Iraqi identity has led to a political system based on keeping various subnational groups happy to secure their cooperation in making and executing policy. The resulting muhasasa, or pact for ruling, means that jobs and political power are divided among the elites of the various subgroups in Iraq. This system has led to corruption and political paralysis on many major issues. Elites have rejected replacing the system with a winner-takes-all type of parliamentary system because it would threaten the interests of their respective subnational groups. This means that for Iraq, subnational allegiances have damaged the country’s prospects to become a fully functional democratic political system. 

Because of the highly fragmented nature of Iraq’s political party landscape based on subnational identities and parties built around specific leaders rather than an ideological platform, it is likely that no one party will come close to winning a majority of the votes in the 2025 national elections.  This means that in 2025, as has been the case since Iraq has held national elections, there will be a long period of negotiation over which parties and personnel will be part of the new government, meaning that the decisions over who wields power in Iraq will largely be made behind closed doors. These negotiations and deals over who will have executive power in Iraq have made many Iraqis feel that they do not really have much say over leads them. Thus, there is little reason to believe that Iraqis will become much more positive about their political system following the upcoming 2025 elections.

Two decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, widespread frustration with the current state of Iraq is leading increasing numbers to express a negative view of life in the post-Saddam era in public opinion polling.

ike all Iraqis at this time twenty years ago, I was completing my family’s final preparations to face the oncoming war after it became clear that hopes of avoiding it were unrealistic dreams. I took my family to live in a more secure area after stocking up on food and water. Warning sirens sounded, the electricity cut off, and the sound of explosions began to rock the new home we had chosen. The skies over Baghdad lit up with deadly fireworks. As my children’s terrified voices grew louder, my main concern was to calm their fears and make them believe my lie that everything would be okay.

It only took three weeks for us to be certain that Iraq had been occupied and that a new chapter in our lives had begun. But the apparent Iraqi response to that reality was more puzzling. According to the news I received on a small transistor radio—my outlet to the world—Iraqis were overjoyed at the downfall of Saddam’s regime and cheering on a new era of democracy, freedom, and prosperity that would make Iraq the 51^st American state. 

The reports made me wonder: why was I not as happy as the rest of the Iraqis referenced on the radio news? Was I different, or was there another side to public opinion that the radio did not mention? By chance, I was reading a book at that time about the influence of public opinion and how to measure it. It suggested to me that if I were able to ask Iraqis their opinions about what happened, I would be able to resolve the contradiction I felt between the outpouring of news about Iraqis’ delight over the invasion and my own pessimistic views about the events and likely future. Subsequently, I convinced my friends and some of my students to conduct the first public opinion poll, focusing just on Baghdad. Just three weeks after the invasion, I had the answer to my question, but it only added to my confusion and concern.

According to the results, there was a clear divide in opinion among Baghdadis—49% of them believed that what had happened was a good thing for them, and 47% agreed with me that it was bad for them instead. On realizing that attitudes were effectively split down the middle, my confusion increased, along with my passion to learn more about Iraqis’ opinions. I hoped through subsequent polling to ask them what led to this discrepancy in their opinions, to the point where I left my job as a university professor and devoted myself entirely to exploring Iraqi public opinion over the next two decades—during which these views have changed in dramatic and intriguing ways.

The twentieth anniversary of the invasion motivated me to ask Iraqis the same questions I had asked in the initial years after 2003 in order to draw a clearer picture of how Iraqis views have shifted. In February, my research group Al-Mustakella, in cooperation with the British research firm Opinion Research Business (ORB) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), surveyed a national sample of 3,000 Iraqis in face-to-face interviews, using computer-assisted interviewing (CAPI) and the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) random sampling method.

Although comparison with the first opinion poll is not statistically accurate, since that poll was taken with a rudimentary methodology and was limited to Baghdad, it is notable that the percentage of Iraqis who say that “the entrance of coalition forces in 2003” was good for them is just 35% today—with most of those respondents who answered positively being Kurds. Among Arabs (Shia and Sunnis), only 29% say that what happened was good. Conversely, two-thirds of Iraqis as a whole believe that what happened in 2003 was bad for them. 

Even more revealing were the answers to the question: “Taking everything into account, do you feel things are better for you now under the present political system or do you think things were better for you before, under the previous regime of Saddam Hussein?” When we first asked this question in 2005, 67% of respondents—most of them Kurds and Shia—answered that their lives in 2005 were better than they were during Saddam’s regime, in spite of the unstable security situation at that time. There has since been a major change in public opinion regarding this question.

The percentage of those who now say that their lives are better than they were during the previous regime has fallen to just 31%, while the percentage of those who say that they were better off during the previous regime jumped to 36%. The other third of Iraqis (33%) say they are just as bad off as they were during the previous regime. 

What stands out the most in these recent figures is that, contrary to the prevailing impression, the major shift in public opinion did not occur just in one region or one ethno-sectarian group. Although the majority of those who say that their situation was better under the previous regime are Sunnis (48%), 33% of Shia now also say that their situation was better under Saddam—higher than the percentage of Shia who say that they are better off under the current regime (29%). 38% of Shia say that they were just as bad off under the former regime. Even among the Kurds, responses are completely different from when polled in 2005,. Although 63% of Kurds say that their lives are better today, more than 20% of them say that their situation was better under the previous regime, and 16% say that they are just as bad off as they were during the previous regime.

Here, we must highlight an important point: these results do not necessarily reflect nostalgia for the former regime as much as a rejection of the current regime and the overall situation in Iraq today. As evidence of this, the majority of those, whether Kurds or Shia, who say that their situation was better during the former regime are less than 30 years old, i.e., they were not alive or were not aware of the situation prior to 2003. Thus their responses do not realistically reflect their opinion of the former regime as much as their discontent with the current situation. 

The current figures indicate Iraqis’ clear frustration and disappointment with the regime and mode of governance in Iraq. Only 40% of those surveyed say that the situation in Iraq is better than it was under the former regime, compared to 59% who say it is worse. These numbers reflect the current political crisis in Iraq and the need to review all the failures that have made many Iraqis nostalgic for the past—not out of love for what came before, but out of spite for the current regime. When interviewed by a TV reporter, an older Iraqi woman said that “the sins of the current regime make the former regime look blameless.” This is the best summary of what has happened in Iraq—an attitude clearly reflected in this latest opinion poll.

Richard Nathan Haass is an American diplomat. He has been president of the Council on Foreign Relations since July 2003, prior to which he was Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and a close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell in the George W. Bush administration.

Dr. Munqith Dagher is the CEO and founder of the Independent Institute of Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS) research group (Al-Mustakella) in Iraq and a Gallup International board member.

Click to access 220328_Dagher_JCPOA_RegionalPoliticsIranianMilitias.pdf

on October 13, Iraqis woke to the sound of nine Katyusha rockets falling on the Green Zone before the special session of parliament that was to be held to select the new Iraqi president. But these rockets were no celebratory shots marking a breakthrough one year after the last Iraqi elections. Although security forces blockedall the roads leading to the Green Zone in order to prevent any demonstrators, they still failed to stop armed factions from expressing their unhappiness about the election of Abdul Latif Rashid to the office of Iraq’s fourth president since the fall of the regime in 2003.

Iraq has suffered from complete political paralysis since its Federal Supreme Court issued a decision in February that the Council of Representatives must have a two-thirds quorum to elect a president. This decision enabled the Coordination Framework forces and their allies to form an opposition bloc that prevented the Sadrist Movement and its allies—including the Sunnis and Kurds—from forming a government after they won a majority in the 2021 elections. The Sadrists had wanted to form a majority government instead of a consensus-based government between political parties, as had been the case during the previous five parliamentary sessions. After winning the most seats—73 total—the Sadrists ultimately refused to form a coalition with the Coordination Framework forces, whom the Sadrists accused of corruption and blamed for Iraq’s ongoing challenges. 

The Sadrists pulled out of the Council of Representatives, which paved the way for other political forces, most of which were aligned with the Coordination Framework, to come to the forefront and proceed with forming a government. These groups were able to form accords with former Sadrist allies, including Kurds and Sunnis, to elect Rashid as president. In turn, Rashid selected Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as the new prime minister. Al-Sudani has close ties to al-Maliki, although he resigned from al-Maliki’s party some time ago. The political process in Iraq is back to business as usual despite the Sadrists’ attempts to reject a system of political consensus.

The Sadrists’ efforts, which were undermined by the Coordination Framework forces, would have limited the authority to form a new government to the groups that had received the most votes, which is how things usually run in democratic societies. However, in Iraq, this would have resulted in two main outcomes. First, most political parties and figures would have lost their influence in government, which would have undermined their political, financial, and military clout. Secondly, it would have robbed Iran of much of its political influence over Iraq by keeping its allies out of the government. This is especially true since the Sadrists have made it clear since the beginning that they oppose foreign meddling in Iraq, whether from Iran, the United States, or any other power. Furthermore, forming a majority government would have created a precedent for future governments to require a majority in order to assume power. The forces with limited popular backing are aware they would not be able to win in future elections if this were the case. 

With the Sadrists out but the Coordination Framework still unable to reach a two-thirds quorum, new political affiliations and agreements were established. Former Sadrist allies, particularly the Sunnis and Kurds, took advantage of the Framework’s need for support and made increased demands in exchange for joining the coalition and forming a government. One of these demands was Masoud Barzani’s insistence that Barham Salih—the candidate for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—be kept away from the presidency, replaced either with a candidate from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) or a different candidate from the PUK. 

The Coalition Framework forces likewise acceded to various Kurdish and Sunni demands which they had previously been unwilling to negotiate on, especially with regard to oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region, Article 140 in the constitution—which established the the Kirkuk status referendum, and removing de-Baathification mechanisms that had been used against Sunnis.

Although the president has now been elected and the nominee for prime minister chosen, it remains to be seen how the two other main actors in the Iraqi political scene will respond, since both the Sadrists and the October/Tishreen Movement have previously opposed the nomination of al-Sudani as prime minister.

The October Movement, which forced former Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to resign and pressured the previous Council of Representatives to change the electoral law, has now lost much of its momentum as a result of being a main target for disinformation and physical attacks from militias and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Ideological conflicts and leadership disputes within the Movement as well as clashes with the Sadrists also led to the splintering of these forces and further loss of momentum. Despite promises to the October Movement from al-Kadhimi’s government, al-Khadimi failed to deliver and has even tried to appease armed parties opposed to the October Movement in hopes that they would back him in the next elections. Al-Kadhimi did not want the October Movement to create issues for his government by protesting against corruption, injustice, lack of social services, and loss of sovereignty. 

Nevertheless, although the movement has lost much of its energy, their ideas remain firmly planted in the minds of most Iraqis, especially the youth. The memory of what was achieved in 2019-2020 remains present for everyday Iraqis and continues to frighten political parties in power. Although the number who went out into the streets on the third anniversary of the October uprising was smaller than expected, there were calls for broader action and it is still possible that a larger demonstration could be organized for October 25. The choice of al-Sudani as prime minister— a politician who had previously been nominated by pro-Iranian forces during the October uprising and whom the October Movement had previously opposed due to his close ties to al-Maliki—will pose a new challenge to the will of the October Movement. It remains to be seen whether these events will prompt youth in Baghdad and southern Iraq to protest further against the regime.

Al-Sudani’s nomination also poses a personal challenge to al-Sadr and his broad popular base. Like the October Movement, al-Sadr had previously opposed al-Sudani’s nomination. Several months earlier, a spokesman for al-Sadr on social media even shared a tweet poking fun at al-Sudani’s nomination because of his ties to al-Maliki, a key political opponent for al-Sadr. Now, the question in everyone’s mind is: How will al-Sadr respond to this nomination? There are three potential scenarios that seem most likely at this juncture. First, al-Sadr could remain quiet about the nomination so that al-Sudani can form his government, and then later mobilize supporters after giving al-Sudani several months to show what he can do. If al-Sudani fails according to the Sadrists’ evaluation, they could organize a popular uprising to remove him. 

Al-Sadr’s silence thus far about al-Sudani’s nomination is not what most analysts expected to see. Nevertheless, there are likely to be problems during the process of choosing a cabinet, with provocations from the Coordination Framework that will inevitably displease the Sadrists. This will make it difficult for the Sadrists to keep quiet for long. Furthermore, the Sadrists might see this transition period as an opportunity to become involved before Framework forces take control of state institutions, especially security forces, which would oppose any peaceful protest movement. This scenario, of course, could also lead to internal political dissidence in the Sadrist camp.

In a second scenario, the Framework forces could successfully appease the Sadrists by giving them some cabinet posts, providing assurances regarding early elections in the future, or even granting the right to veto Coordination Framework cabinet members. This does not appear to be a very likely scenario based on what al-Sadr has previously said. He indicated to those close to him that he does not want to negotiate behind the scenes with Coordination Framework forces. Case in point, the same social media spokesperson for al-Sadr tweeted days ago that Sadr won’t allow any of his supporters to join the new cabinet.

The third scenario is the one that seems most likely. In this scenario, the Sadrists would wait for the right moment—for example, the third anniversary of the October uprising on October 25, 2022 or a similar occasion—to organize popular demonstrations and undermine the formation of the new government. There are reports circulating that talks have occurred to form agreements between the October Movement leaders and Sadrists to unify their efforts and mobilize forces for a major popular uprising to topple the regime. 

If a popular alliance between the Sadrists and the October Movement is successful, there is no doubt that divisions within the Coordination Framework forces, which became apparent during the selection of the new president, will become further entrenched. The Coordination Framework will split between “doves”—such as Haider al-Abadi, who will insist on appeasing al-Sadr and not moving ahead with the new government—and “hawks”—who will resort again to using militias against a popular uprising. Armed conflict remains likely unless religious and political forces such as Ayatollah al-Sistani are able to keep weapons from falling into the hands of non-state actors. The new government, even if it is able to proceed, will certainly face challenges on many fronts, which will render al-Sudani’s task practically insurmountable. Will al-Sudani be the Tom Cruise of Iraq and pull this ‘mission impossible’ off? We don’t have to wait long to find out the answer

New polling reveals how the Iraqi public views Baghdad’s ongoing political crisis.

August 24 was a pivotal day in the conflict between Sayyid al-Sadr and his Coordination Framework rivals for the future of the Iraqi government. Sadrists took an unexpected step in surrounding the Supreme Judicial Council building, which led to the suspension of the judiciary’s work. The move likewise led to unintended consequences, with observers concerned that there could be a full coup in Iraq, particularly after the Sadrists had obstructed the Iraqi Council of Representatives previously. 

However, the Sadrists seemed to quickly realize that their supporters needed to withdraw from in front of the Supreme Judicial Council building after a variety of domestic and foreign forces indicated they were not amenable to this step. This new move raises the question of whether the Sadrists’ retreat signals a strategic loss in their ten-month-old conflict with the Coordination Framework forces.

In examining the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for both sides, we can see that each side has different strengths. The Sadrists have a very loyal and well-organized grassroots base that significantly expands their capabilities. Their critiques of the quota system, corruption, and dependence on Iran have always been well-received by the Iraqi public. Their rhetoric also closely mirrors the discourse produced by the Shia religious authority (marja‘) in Najaf. Sadr’s main stumbling block has been his involvement with the previous and current governments and his falling out with the October 2019 youth a few months after the uprising. There is a silent portion of the Iraqi street that subsequently began to question the Sadrists’ intent. 

For its part, the Shia Coordination Framework has been backed by a network of financial and arms coalitions, some of which Finance Minister Ali Allawi alluded to in his recent resignation speech. This alliance successfully applied a carrot and stick approach to control the deep state and gained additional power after the Sadrists withdrew from the Council of Representatives. The withdrawal allowed those seats to be replaced by sympathetic representatives who strengthened the Coordination Framework’s parliamentary legitimacy. As is also true for the Sadrists, the Framework’s main weakness is the Iraqi public, which seems skeptical and even angry about the Framework’s performance, especially their corruption during the last twenty years and their complete dependence on Iran. If the Iraqi public is reluctant to support the Sadrists, they are decidedly against the Coordination Framework forces.

With regard to opportunities and threats, the most recent opinion poll conducted by Al-Mustakella for Research Group (IIACSS) indicates that there is a real opportunity for the Sadrists to achieve their stated objective through peaceful regime change and popular revolution. We should first mention that this poll was conducted after the Sadrists entered the Green Zone but before they staged a sit-in in front of the Supreme Judicial Council building. The poll found that 55 percent of Iraqis supported the Sadrists entering the Green Zone, which jumped to 61 percent in southern Iraq, where both the Sadrists’ and Coordination Framework’s popular bases are located. The good news for the Sadrists was that more than 50 percent of respondents in the south believed that the Sadrists’ revolt aimed to reform the regime, while only 19 percent felt that the Sadrists wanted to seize power. 

The same percentage believed that the real reason behind the Sadrists’ actions was their conflict with the Coordination Framework or Maliki. In other words, prior to surrounding the Supreme Judicial Council building, the Sadrists had been gaining legitimacy with the Iraqi public. This would have been a major political lever for the Sadrists, especially given that the same poll found that there was very little trust in the political process as a whole. Only 12 percent of respondents said they had confidence in the Council of Representatives, which fell to 8 percent in the south—the lowest level of confidence in any Iraqi parliament since 2005. Only 25 percent of Iraqis have confidence in the government and only 17 percent believe that Iraq is headed in the right direction.

It is clear that the Sadrists were on their way towards winning the battle over popular support—at least until the Coordination Framework forces exploited the fallout from the Sadrists’ attempt to suspend the judiciary. This raised fears at both the local and global levels regarding what might happen if the Sadrists prevailed. The Framework forces quickly made the most of the suspension of the judiciary—though this body also suffers from declining public trust at 38 percent—to rekindle fears that the Sadrists could monopolize power and promote extremism if they won. 

Nevertheless, the Framework forces overplayed their hand, making the same mistake that they had when the Sadrists withdrew from the Council of Representatives and the Framework rushed to declare victory, claiming that the Sadrists had lost. This reflected a misreading of Sadr and his followers, who became more insistent about achieving their goal of changing the political regime while enjoying widespread popular support. The Framework forces miscalculated the extent of the threat that they were facing and overestimated their limited capacities to counter it. As polling demonstrates, there is a great deal of popular rage against the political regime. Sadr has announced that his objective was regime change, aligning with the will of the people, while the Framework made clear they were trying to preserve the regime.

The Coordination Framework forces did not seem to realize that this was a long battle that would be won by whichever side had greater endurance and sustained momentum. Sadr has a strong base that would be difficult to dismantle even in a longer conflict. In contrast, the Framework is a coalition force composed of elements with divergent objectives, ties, and approaches, which could make it easier to break up the group over time. Furthermore, the Framework has not been able to achieve anything tangible to help the masses and assuage their anger and frustration with the regime. The Framework has become good at the game of obstruction, but is neither willing nor able to enact the changes that the people want. 

The Sadrists’ odds of victory will be more favorable if they exploit the Framework’s main weakness, namely their distance from and hostility towards the Iraqi public, which is angry with the Framework while skeptical of the Sadrists. If the Sadrists are able to allay the public’s fears regarding their intentions and rebuild their alliance with the October 2019 youth forces, there is no doubt they will achieve their goals. It is evident that the Iraqi political regime is on the verge of collapse, but the bigger question remains as to whether Sadr and his followers will be able to topple the regime with their broad popular coalition in the short term, or whether this be pushed further into the future—and perhaps into the hands of another popular force—if the Sadrists fail to take advantage of their present opportunity.